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I  nupposc th:tt CV 1  rybody i.n  this di:;linguit:hcd nuoicnco will  . 
nuroc with me when. I  say tk.~.t :tll political,  economic a.llll socitll leaden; 
I 
in  l~uropo a.rc con.fronfcd al this very tnomcnt:,  ;n tho rH.:a.r  !uturc,  and 
even nftcnva:x.·ds, ••••  wi.tl1 two .fundamental questions 
The first question is  l'l.~latcd to the :F;uropcan Comrn.unity in 
its  (;~lf.  Is there any future for this Community in the world,  as a  pool 
of economic dynmnism and eenerous prospel'ity,  as a  centre of political 
influence,  and as the architect of a  design of civilization ? 
The second question is 1·elateci to the presence of the United 
Kingdom in the  }~l.lropean Comrnw:1ity.  Which are the a.im.s of British 
membership,  and its adva::1tages both to the Gomm.w1ity and to Great-
Britain,  in the lieht of the so-called rcnegociation  ? 
Of course,  these two sets of questions are closely interrel<tled 
•  ' 
and cam10t be easily disenta.ngJcd.  If our EuroJ?.ean Com.munity ceases 
to maintain and increase economic and social Holidarity among its rnembe:~.·: 
e:nd shows unable to develo;> convergent political initiatives,  then the 
temptation will be great in Britain to listex: to "the call of the open scas
11
• 
'  On the other hand,  for a  Community fraught in uncertainty and lack of v.'ill, 
a 
11  renegotiation" leadinn to Britain's withdrawal might be the ultimate 
blow which could break it down once and for all. 
So it seems difficult to answer the f:irs't question ,,·ithout tackJing  .. 
t:le second.  Ho\vever,  the:::-e  is clearly a  priority in the political issues. 
::~or if the Community can overcome its present difficulties,  then a  United 
Kingdom leaving it would be heading for  s~rious economic trouble 
..  I .. 2
even  with  plenty  of 13Pitish  OP  C::::cottislt  oi I  - <1nd  political 
isol.:Jtiorl- even  \·dth  {I  spccinl  I ink  Hith  the:  u.s.A-. 
If  SQrnebody  W<.H'e  to  dr•m-,~  a 
11 :•hH.HHlHC  on  the  State  of 
Union"!  cls  tlw  President  of  the  U.S.A  lws  to  do  ever•y  ye.::1r,  then 
the  picture  -thourd1  l'<tthtH~  impr•cssioni~1tic- would  be  Pat:hcr 
gl oorny,  a I though  there  have  been  some  sparks  of hope  dut·i ng 
recent  weeks. 
1 •  8 r i t  i s h  rn e •n be r s h i r>  o f  the  Com m  u  •1  i t  Y... 
Since  the  Counci I  of  Minister•s  rneeti ng  rn  Luxembourn, 
on  4  June,  He  have  some  more  detai ls'on  the  kind  of  chunges 
the  United  Kingdom  \.,.auld  I ike  to  obtain  in  the  policies and 
decisions  of  the  Community.  They  have  been  stated by  the 
British  Foreign  Secretary,  MP.  J .. CALU\G!IAN,  under  the  following 
rna i n  he  a d i n 9 s  : 
"1.  The,Comrnunity  budget- an  important  mat~er for  us  but  one 
which  recogntse  wi  I I  raise difficultibs for  others". 
"  2. ·The  Common  Agricultural  Pol icy  where  \.,te  shall  be  suggesting 
major  improvements  consistent  with  the  bt•oad  principles  on  \o~hich 
the  pol icy  is  based". 
"  3.  The  Co~monwealth and  developing  countries  where  improvements 
are  necessary  in  both  the  tr•ade  and  aid fields". 
"  4 .  R  e g i on a I  r1 n d  I n cl u s t  r i a !  p o I i c y  w h c r e  i t  i s  i •nn o r' tcm t  f o r  u s 
·-~  t  •  \  "".  .:  ~  ...  ·-. 
to  be  certain  that 'the  ;,uYcs  of  the  Cornrnunity  \.Ji  II  ene1ble  Br·it<lin  ,_ 
to  pursue  the  effect i vc  poI i c i ~s  \.Jh  i ch  .:1rc  required  if the 
British  econo"Tiv  is to  begin  to  ~wow. at  u  Pnte  ,..,rll  i ch  '" i I I  uppronch 
the  Community  average  rather  than  to  sink  further  below  it"  • 
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''fhet·(~  is  <1  fifth  quc~•tion  •lhou!;  the  ful:ut'n  of  ccotHl'IIIC, 
m  o n e t o r' y  oil  d  p o I i t  i c il I  u n i on • • • ,  t h o  fHH'i i t i o n  on  t l1 c s c  m  «  t t et·  s 
is tfHtt  n  ~Jr'Ccll:  d(iHI  of  further•  wor~k  ·•nd  discur;sion  wi II  be 
requiPnd  be fot'c  fillY  f11r ther•  decisions  Ccln  he  t<lken  111  pur•su it 
oF  these  ~)C  ·)C t'tll  oims.  \vo  are  ver'y  rc.:Hiy  to  continue  \vi th  thc8C! 
tnlks  in  or• de t'  thot  \oJC  Cc1t1  c1 I I  elucidnte,  111  (I  constructive 
spirit, 
'""') t  content  it  11li.1)'  be  possible  to  ~)I VC  to  the:m". 
In  dca I i 11~1  loJi th  these  foul"  1 ssues,  the  Foreign  ~cerei;.;,I'Y 
' stressed t1vo  i rnpor·t<1n.t  points  : 
- The  first  concerns the exist  in~  T t'eut i e s  : 
"In  our  judDcment  - he  sui d  - rn in i stei'S  w i II  find  that  the 
proposals  I  shal I  put  befor-e  you  if accepted  would  not  requrre 
chnn£jcs  in  the  tr•ea ties  and  we  sha I I  continue  on  that  bns is 
thouf!h  of  course  our  reserve  on  treaty  amcnuments  continues  to 
stand''. 
The  second  concer•ns  the  cur-rent  \vork  of  the  Com•nunity: 
"We  shu II  cont i nuc  - he  said  - to  c-::>opePntc  fu I I y  in  its  woPk 
as  we  have  done  in  recent  weeks.  Of  couPse  I ike  other  members 
of· the  Community,  from  time  to  time  there  wi  I I  be  issues  upon 
which  we  shal I  have  to  put  u  Peserve  so as  to  sufeguapd  OUP 
negotiating position,  but  '"e  shall  not  do  so  out  of  a  desir·e 
to  hold  up  the  work  of  the  Community  but  bcc~use genurne 
differences  cannot  be  reconciled". 
I  would  now  I ike  to  take  up  one  by  one  the  four  assues 
mentioned  before. 
1.  Co·n'Tl~~-D  .  ..r i cuI tur·ol  poI icy  (jnd  food  pr  1 ces 
This  is  t1  very  difficult  problem,  if we·w<lnt  to  muintflin 
t h e  f r e e  c i I' c u I  <1 t  i on  o f  a ~}r i c u I t u r <1  I  pro  J u c t s  i n  the  Corn m  u n i t y 
and  assur--e  an  odcCluC~te  i ncorne  to  the  farmers. 
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In  Gt>(!tlt  Bt•itnin  ns  on  individuol  counb•y,. this  l<wt 
obJective  htl!3  bt'lcn  tpnditionnully  achieved  by  the  ~o-cnl led 
"deFiciency  PtlY''Ients'',  This  n  pcpfect  syBtcrn  for>.  •1  countr•y 
thnb  is  a  I urne  i mpot't:cp  of  foo<istuffs  nnd  in  which'  on I Y  :~ 
s m  a I I  p  .;~r• t  of  t; he  n c t  i v e  pop  u I H t  i on  1 s  w  o t' k i n g  i n  <~ fW i c u I t u t• c • 
(And even then,  Uw  system proved too costly for !wmc products by the 
end of the sLxtics). 
To adopt such a  syst<.~rn for the whole of the enlarged ConJ.mu.~l.i  t;·." 
which is largely self-supporting in food products and has still sevcl·al 
nlillions of .{a;rmers,  would mean : 
- an ambitious administrative task ;  and a  huge financial bill for the 
tax-payer when world prices arc low ; 
- the acceptance of a  questionable dependance on third countries for some 
essential food supplies.  The shortages and soaring world market 
- .  prices which we experienced last yea:-,  some export lirnitations imposed: 
by our traditional suppliers demon.st:-ated clearly the "exte1·nal" limits 
of a fondamental change L"'l  the C. A. P. 
This is not to say that the C • .A. P.  cannot be arnended,  nor 
adapted to some specific British circu."!lstanccs.  Let me state it this waT 
.. 
- The co:r:>..n10n  agricultural policy was conceived and ytorkcd out without 
I 
taking into account the situation of B:r-:tish agriculture and food supplie:.:
1 
and this "omission" was due to a  very s~'ccial reason :  the fact that the 
United Kingdom was not a  member of the Community ! 
~I. 
' 
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and cconornic  rc~ponuibili.tius,  can  OJ~lr l.w' altered ~;rndua.lly.  In fa.c;t, 
son1.c h:iptll:tnnt chaugos havo  nlr<.~o.cty ocon r.<.:hi.ovcd  :  t.l,le  txadHional 
CAP has been completed with a  sot of st:t·J.tcb  .. tr<'tl mcanurcs,  and t1HHi(;! 
have been. ;J.cia.pte;;d  to a  specific Bl'itis!: demand with tlic so-called 
- I t  i s  of  co  u t~ !'w  u nco  n c c i v <~ h I e  rot'  t: h c  rn e •n be r  s tnt<~  s  to  a d up  i": 
the  C.A.P.  in  order to  meet  some  British  Hishes,  unci  fine! 
nfter\.,rards  thot  t:he  United  Kingdo'lr  is  leaving  the  Cornmunity 
a I together~.  Comrnun i ty  r>o I i c i es  a,re  ta  i I ored  out  to  fi·t  a 
given  set  of  members.  We  cannot  adapt  thern  to  fading  shnpes 
In  the  r~est,  would  I ike  to  pick  up  the  following 
statement  made  by  the  Br• it ish  Foreign  Sccrtd:ary  :  "we  l'ccogn i zo 
thilt  for•  Eur•opcan  L·w:nei'S  the  CAr  hDs  achieved  rnuch,  nnd  that  II\ 
a d d i t  i on  an  <1 s s u t' an c e  o F  s u p p I 1 e s  a t  k n o '" n  p r i c c s  i n  a  w or I d 
where  both  pr i ccs  and  <:1va i I ilb i I i ty  can  be  u  npred i ctah  I e • 
T h e  q u e s t  i on  t h e r~ c f o r e  i s  \oJ h e t h c r ,  1.,r i t h o u t  overt  h r o  \oJ i n 0  t h c 
sy~tcm,  Br-itish  i nt:ePests  as  o  I flrs.rc  consumer'  CCln  be  accornodated 
to the  pr~ inc i pI cs  of  Community  preferences,  free.  c i rcu I at ion 
of  goods,  and  conrrnunity  financing.  Provided  so•ne  ma.Jor. 
changes  ape  mode,  we  be I 1 eve  t!v:Jt  it wou I d  be  poss i b I e  to  do 
so". 
\1/hen  I oak i ng  at the  rest  of  the  statement,  and  apart 
from  the  arguments  related  to  the  own  resour•ces  find  the  imports 
frorn  third countr i cs,  I  have  the  i rnpress ion  tht1t  the  more 
specific British  demands  by  R.nd  I urge  cou I d  hoi I  do\m  to  : 
- a  f u I I - f I c clg e d  n p p I i c n t  i on  of  t h e  s t r u ci: u r' n I  ref  o  ,~ rn  rn e u s u r c s 
already  adopted  by  the  Counci I,  but  only  implc,nented  with 
some  delny; 
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the  nuidt~l inos  \vhich  the  Commi!H.1ion  propo:;ed  in  its 
Ill  0 m  0 r· (l/\ d ll  10  0 r  3  1  0 c t 0 b c r·  1  9  7 3  0 ll  t h  (!  "  ~~ e 0  I'  8 (} n i s  <1 t i 0 n 
oF  the  cornm~1n  c\gr· i cuI bwal  poI icy",  fHHI  its rwoposa I 
on  su~Flr. · 
It is  i mpor·tnnt  a I so  to stress thot  tho  Br  .. it  ish 
Foreign  ~ecr'ctoPy "r-ecognised that,  since  our- cflrl icl" 
. criticisms  were  made  three  years  ago,  world  prices  for  most 
(l~)t·icultur~al  comrnodities  are  rtluch  h.ighcP  thnn  they  were  then. 
It  is  I ikcly  (but  not  absolutely  certain!  thnt thePe  wi  I I  be  o 
closer  r~ei<Jtionship  bet\veen  Community  and  wor•ld  pr"'rces  thon 
in  the  post.  \1/e  can  turn  this to  our  advantage  for  it  grves 
the  Community  the  opporturlity  to  ensure  that  whatever  the 
futuPe  rnovemcnt  of  h'orld  prices,  the  CAP  must  not  become 
an  instrument  of  excessive  protectionism  or  a  threat  to  worlcl 
tr.:tde  tht•ough  the  generation  c1nd  dispos<d  of sut'pluses" • 
• 
These  principles  seem  pPetty  rec1sonable;  but  one 
must  not  forget  that  in  a~wicultlir-al  policies,  dis<lSJreernents 
on  -apparently- suwll  items  cc1n  hnve  large  political  impl i-
cations  (~·). 
2.  A  more  open  Community 
·'·luy  sny  rn  this  context  that  the  classic argument  about.: 
the  i m.;ard-1 ook i ng  Cornrnun i ty  is  to  u  I or,ge  extent  exa~1gerated 
and  even  false. 
As  f<Jr  as  inciustriill  'P_!'oducts  ar,e'·conccr"'ned,  the  Cornmv-
n i ty  has  much  I O\ver  i rnpol't  duties  than  the  United  Kingdom 
or  the  United  C::.tutes.  l t  "''1s  the  Cornmun i ty  thnt  took  the 
i n i t  i c1 t  i v e ,  d u r i n g  the  f i t' s t  UN C  TA 0-: Con f c r en  c e  i n  Gene  v <1  ( 1 ') 6  :~ ) 
to  eluborote  il  schernfl  of  tariFf pt•efePcnces  for- the  developin~J 
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c 0 ll  n  tt~ i l~ s  i  . in  r  il  c t;  t h  (l  [} n j b~  d  i( i II  H d  0 Ill  I  0 n d  tl b  () v  ~'  n I I 
i:hc  Unit;cd  St;d.:<~s,  \-Jet·c- ,,l;  t:lwt:  time- fot~cnfully opposed 
to  lhc  id·~CI  of  such  pf'<1Fet'<lnecs.  Besides,  the  Co111rnunii:y 
hns  concluded  on  impr(~t~sive  I i st:  of  ft~ee-b•nde  ilf)l'cern(~rd:s 
vd t h  t3 I'' it  u i n I  s  0  I d  p dt' t n c r• s  i n  E  F  T A  u n d  H  i t h  cl  s e ... i e s  0 r 
And  Nh(~n -the  Comrnun ity 
tt~ i cd  t:o  conv i nee  i t:s  rncrnbct·  st,1tes  th.1t  they  shou I d  eng<Jgc 
on  m1  inct'C<tS<.HI  t.1t'~Jut  oF  fin<mcinl  aid  {:o  developing 
co  u n tr· i e s ,  i t  \¥ o s  t h  c  U  • K  •  ( il  n d  I t o I y \  vJ h i c h  we t' o  rn o s t 
reluctnnt,  \ldrnittedly  on  c1ccount  of their  O\vn  bctlance  of 
'puymcnts  difficult:ics  (the  0.7  ?~  tnrget  lws  been  a~weed by 
ull  ot  Counci I  on  30  Apri 11. 
So,  as  fa P  us  our  r c I o t  i  ~J.:'::....~!:b..  _  _E_.l.:!_~.__rt e v ~:.lop i n q _<.:~•.!_l_t r:J  .. ~!-~ 
() r c  con  c c r· n c d ,  t h  c  8 r• i t  i s h  a r  ~:lU •n e n t s  b o i I  d o \m  to  t he  f o I I o \·I i n  ~  1 
tHo  problems  : 
- the  I 0 w  t m• i r r  s ,  f r c e  t  .~ u d  c  (1 9 r e c Ill c n t s  (1 n d  9 en e T' ,] I  t () I"'  i f f 
p t' e f e r en c c s  '" h i c h  I  rn c n t  i on  c d  be for' e  me e t  '" i t h  s e r i o  11 s 
I imitAtions  tn  the  u~wiculturol  field •. This  bt'ings  us  l><lck 
to  the  problem  of  the  C.A.P. 
- Unti I  no1.,.,  the  development  aid  of the  Co•nmunity  itself  (lvith 
t h c  except i on  of  food  <J  i d I  '" u s  I i rn i t c d  t o  t h c  a s soc i () t e d 
countries.  The  United  Kingdom  insists  on  widening  the 
gcogr·aph i co I  area  for  these  operations.  The  other  member 
stntes  seem  wi  I I ing- and  some  of  them  arc  even  glod- to 
accept  this  neH  opproach  ;  but  sorne  others  insist ·that this 
rn0y  not  I ead  to  reducing  our·  clove I oprnent  tl i d  to  the  (poorest) 
developin~t countr·ics  in  AFrica  ..•  whicn  br~ings  us  b.::~c'< 
ta the  question  of  our  to~al  aid  (and  the  British  difficulties 
tn  that  respect\, 
But  the  '"hole  trend  of  the  Community's  poltcJcs  s1nce 
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cnlnPHe•,lcnt  has  h<~en  a\v<ly  fl'~)lfl  the  rwt~r·owet•  1\ssocintc-
oricntntcd  f.!PPt'<Hlch  of  e<11•l  iet•  ycut•s  find  to\"'"'rds  a  viidcr~ 
i two 1  vern c n t  i n  the  p  ,~ o b I c m  s  o f  the  de  v c I o !1 i n  ~J  c·o u n  tt~ i e s 
us  a  \  ... hole.  To  Hive  only  two  CX<lnlf.."des~  look  nt  the  fir·st: 
steps  the  Comrnunity  t:ook  lilSt  ycrw  to  irnpl<:~m(mt  the  Joint 
De c I  <1 r ,, t  i on  o f  i n ten  t  i on  to  the  A  s i <1 n  Corn m  o mv e il I t h ,  n n d  o t 
the  propos<J Is  my  co II ea~wc C I au de  CllEYSSON  t'ccent I y  mnde  for" 
a  subste1nt in I  contribution  to  nn  omcr•g i ng  fund  for  the 
countries hit  by  the  energy  crisis,  most  of  them  non-associutes 
in  Asia.  So  I  think  that,  after alI,  this  problem  is  one  of 
those  that  can  be  most  ~asi ly  settled. 
The  second  big  issue  is the  UK-argurnent  for  a  more  open 
Corn m  u n i t y  b c a r• s  on  o u r  r e I at i on s  \"' i t h  the  ll n i t c d  S t a t c s •  To 
use  the  \\'or•ds  of  your  Forei!=Jn  SecPeL.~ry:  "Consultation, 
cooperation  and  coordinnti~n between  Europe  and  the  United 
States  shou I d  be  c:1s  natura I  as  brcil thing..  In  our  vi C\oJ  it 
IS  essential". 
0f  course  there  has  been  a  consideruble  improvement 
over  the  lust  few  weeks,  with  the  successful  conclusion  of 
the  trade  ncgot i at ions  unde1~ art i c I e  XX l V. 6  of  the  GATT 
(com  pen  st~t ions to  our  p.:H'tners  for·  the  en i a rgernent  of  the 
Community)  und  the  agreement  ren ched  on  11  June  bct\oJecn  the 
Ministers  of  Foreign  Affoirs  on  a  pr·agrnatic  appr•oach  of  the 
US-Eur·opean  d i <ll ogue. 
But  I  1"'ou I d  l ike  to  drcl\v  your  <lttcnt ion  on  some 
fund<'lmentul  prob I erns  which  arc  bound  to  I c.1 d  noH  und  then  to 
differences  of  opinion  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  -; 
The  EuroperJn  Economic  Community  is the  ,~esult  of  <1 
co I I e c t  i v e  "'c:1 g e r  t a k e n  up  by  t h e  co  u n t r  i e s  \"' h i c h ,  a t  ·the  i n s t  i -
gation  ond  "'ith  the  support  of  the  United  ~tates,  tt~ies  to 
r n i s e  E  u  ,~ o p c  u b o v e  i t s  con  d i t  i on  of  n  f r n ~J'n en t e d  m  o s fl 1 c  of 
. I. 
~  ·~  ~-·--------'-----9sntcs  d~hil itnttHI ·und  \.J(Hik<~ne~l  by  Lhe  ~econd  \vor~ld  \~.:JP.  The  .. 
llim  \'IuS  to  t•cnder'  these  slut:es  less  vulncr~nble  t(.)  extel"l\<:11 
pressure which t::lt..:.::'!.ntcly could have tnl-:.cn  the form of a.l·mcd couflic:l', 
a.nc.l  to internal t:?lle.:l'<"'<lls  resulti!lg frorn n1iscry and dism:dcr. 
J::>...-p::essci in another way,  the airn.,  iiI rnay quote WoodrOY'/ 
Wilson.  was to t:::an.;;.:o~m Eu1:opc into  11a  place safe for democracy". 
l!"ro1n the veJ:y b-;:gi:-.:"tiag  of the expcrirncnt this co1.1cern1  which also 
served as t.he  in~.?::ra::ion behind the setting-up o£ the North-Atlantic 
Alliance,  was i::s..lit>:-'""·oly li11ked with a  desire to reorgardze the coun-
tries of Weste:::-:t =:u:-o?e (at all cvcntst  those sitaated on the conti.ncnt2l 
mainl2.nd) into 2.  .s:.:1glc unit in which a.J.l  lna.terial resource::? would be 
pooled.  By co:·:.:.:.::.g  t.::.>gcthcr  in this new entity  the  coun.trie~ of Weste;:n 
Europe also  so·~;:-.:~-:> achieve a  pooling of inD.ue:.:~ce and~ by virtue of. 
their common as:: :>cstior'l.,  even hoped to conier on the entity o.f which 
they would be p:::.:-::  ~  econornic po·wcr and a  political influence exceed:ing 
the combined  st.~=.  :>£  :2-.:eir  individual potentials. 
A  firs: :::..:~;;;:::l}Jt  (thanks to the signing ·a: the ECSC Tx·eaty) to 
give the Com.--n"""=:-T o.:  t.he Six a  political structure o£ the federal type 
failed abysmally.  T:.-:.:.s  v:as the European Defense Comn1w1ity and its 
logical upshot,  :::::~;  E::=opean Political Con\munity.  To tell the truth,  it  .. 
was lwndicappeC. :::::-::;::-:::.  ::b.e  iirst because it tried to tackle the problcm.s  · 
,_ 
both of national :s::-;-e:::-.:;::.gnty  of the participant Sta:cs and rearmament oC 
Gerr:n.c:my head o~  . 
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tirnc th0 Europo;:  .  .:-.1:  !:.?.c  dctu·Jy enough starnina lo stand up anainut the 
. challenge of  stall~-=.  ·:!::-.=~<::.vours.  The custorns union progrcssc!<l rapidly. 
However,  the  s::.~~~.e:  ·;;?...;;  not true with 1·cgard to jo5  .. n.t  policicr;,  where fol· 
the 1noment wo  e.::-;;  ::..:.~i<cd to the sphere of agricu.!tul.·c.  No dgnificuni. 
progress lu1.s  1)ct:n made regarding the effective c:oordi1:n.tiou o! econom.i<: 
policies and monet.c.ry integration is crumbling c.itcr a  :rathe:~.· good staxt. 
.  . 
This p2.:rtial success combined with<-:?..  ?artial failure is undoubted. 
one of the main  el·~:nenis behind. the  US<Curopcz~ strains.  Son.1.e  n1.cm her 
states of the Com:::.1.u.uity are afraid to engage in a.  constant an{open dialogll'.: 
with the U.S. A.,  because they fear that such a  C.alogue will raise new 
clisagreen1ents bet\vcen the rnembc:r states and p::cvcnt the cn1.ergency 
of a  ''European id~!J.tity". 
Another  reason  for"  fr· i ct ion  hus  been  th;:,t  th~ fj rst 
hesitating  st~Ds of  the  Nine.to  align  their  foreign  policies 
h.::Jve  been  taken  \,·ithout  any  adequate  ins-:itutionol  under-pinnin 
which  would  h~ve faci I itated a  dialogue  ~ith the  U.S.  on 
i·ssues  such  as  -:-~he  }·Iiddle  East  \·thet"'e  Eur~'):::>can  and  U.S.  inten::~d;· 
certainly  overlap  but  do  not  always  correspond  exactly  with 
eachother. 
In this ...-iew,  a  solid European unity is the best warrant for a 
constructive atl<~::.:ic dialogue,  embracing : 
- the trade ncgot:.'=i<:ions  ; 
,, 
·- the reform of tl:;";:!  internationa.l monetary  .. sys.te:::::l 
the energy prob~2m 
- the  11revitalizat:.::m" of the Atlantic Alliance. 
- on  emerging  c~~~on foreign  pol icy  of  the  ,  .. 
,, 1 ne. 
Of cou:-se#  we have to take into accm.::::.: the fact that the opposing: 11
.  ' 
c  •  •  ·  •  •  "  •  ''  •  :r 11·tl. c't.)1·1
1 1·.::tdictio::ts,  a. nc.L also tha.t they  poSltlons are no~ :::-t:c  I.r.om  l.t.~u  L  ~>  • 
arc understood ir..  vc-:y differ  out ways oy  tlH~ 'pa:::::.es.  '.Chis  rnorc than HHY 
·  t  1  · ··  t"on and a  dc<·irc for  pleading shows t'l:.;  need !or an attempt <.\  ·  c  an::: ca  ·1.  •  .  Oj 
·  1  -· ·  h  1  All'  ·  con· l"~tn-·"'d at best to stagnation  iranknes  s  wlt lOU': v,.·!nc  t ;.e  1anco 1s  •  c"'  ·--
and ut worst to withering away,  and so bein~ ux1a'!:Jle  to cope with the 
1nany challenges v;hich arc facing the West  • 
Though the EEC countries have so far strenuously reJected 
any comprehensive discussion of all the problems 1nentioned,  and partly 
for good reasons,  there is - and the1:e must be - an ovcl·all vision of 
.American -European relations.  HO\..,·evcr m.u.ch it may be desired and 
opportune to n1aintaiu separate ncgotiz.tions on each set of problems, 
• 
such negotiations nevertheless form an integral part o£ our overall rcl<'t.·w 
tions.  Even more,  son1.e Europeans feel that the ability of Europe to 
define a  clear cut position within the. o•era.ll frarnework and thus reveal 
the true extent of the "European identity'' will show what this identity is. 
worth. 
3.  The  Com~unity  bud~ct  nnd  its  "own  resources" 
Another  v:::r'y  i rnportant  objective  conc~t·ns the  Cornmun i ty 
budget:  and  its so-calles  "9wn  r·esour·ccs/',  In  his  recent 
Luxemburg  statement  (4  June)  on  EEC  terms,  M.  CALLAGHAN 
made  it per•Fectly  cle<:tr  that  a  solution  to the  budget  pr•oblern 
is  ccntt·al  to  the  Br~itish  objectives  in  renegotiation. 
As_you  know,  the  financing  of  the  Community  budget  is 
quite  o  co·npl icate  mntter·.  Under  the  present  trnnsitional 12
-·  I),  ·~ 
iiPN)f1~)0r:lCIIts  (1')7.1-1977),  Bt•ii:Hin'n  slwPc~  or  ·:·the  budnot 
Hi II  ri~>o  ur<Jdu.:tlly  Fr•o111  its  pt'(~scnt  I<!Vel  of  ..  11  ~o  in 
1973  8,7  %)  to  19,32%  in  1977. 
.  +  1  ( 
But  fr~om  1
1)78  on,  the  f3t•itish  sh.:H'e  will  in  principle 
be  due  on  the  exclusive  bnsis  of  the  "own  resources". 
0 n I y  f o I'  t he  b u d  ~l e hJt•  y  y c a r s  l 9  7 8  an d  1 9 7  'J ,  the  r e  r c m  a i n s 
I i m i t  s  to  the  i n c r• ease  i n  t h c  t' c I o t  i v e  s h c-tr e •  8 u t  fro  rn 
1980  on,  the  ovn'l  t't.:~sout•cesrnechnnisrn  v,ri  II  function  \vithout 
br<'lkes. 
Bu~  ~hat  is  exactly  ~eant by  "own  resources"  ~nd 
how  does  the  syste'TJ  ;..·ork  ? 
Th~  1-..:Jy  the  o•m  l'csources  sy.stem  shou I d  \oJor-k  \-IdS 
laid do  .... :l  in  the  decision  of  21  Apr·il  1970  foilowing the 
orinciple  ngree·nent  of the  !1.-.gue  Surnmit  Conference.  This 
;:}ecision  provides  for  the  step  by  step Tcplaccr:1e:nt  of  the 
financial  contribution  of the  member  states,  fixed  tn 
y~rcentag<!,  ,,·ith  the  auto1wtic  nll.ocati on  to the  Co.-nmunity 
.:>f  c:lll  agr~icultural  levies,  all  custorns  duties  and  a 
veriab!e  "Co.'<  up  to  1-;  of  the  VAT • 
..) n  t; n  e  B  r  i t  i s h  s i de  I  i ·t  i s  f c I t  t  h u t  i f  t 11 i s  s y s t c  rn 
; s  not  a ! -:: e r c d  by  t  h c  c n d  of the  t ran  s i t  i on  a I  p e r' i o d, 
;rcat  Britain  wil I  have  to  bear  an  undue  budgetary  burden. 
I~  i s  fee ! ; r. g  i s  nw i n I y  b q sed  on  t h c  f o I  I ow i n g  (:! s sump  t  i on s : 
- 6rit~n's growth  rate 
the  evolution  of  ~orlcl  Food  prices,  and 
- Brit:is~  i.,ports  fro·'~  ou·tside  the  Community. 
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A  c bw I I y ;  t h  c  JW  0 p 0 I'  t  i 0 n  be b·H:~ c n  n  I' i t n j I) ,  s  G  N  r  (J n d  t h  (~ 
Comm\Jnity  GNP  is  about  18  ;b.  It  is  nc::rtrwnlly  nclmitl;ed 
tfwt this .figut•e  will  even  bt~  lo\.JCt'  by·  the  en~l  oF  the 
seve.ntics.  In  his  statement  of  4  June,  Mr.  CALLAGIIr\N 
even  mentioned  the fi gurc  of  14  ]b  ""h  i~ch,  1 n  my  op 1 n 1 on, 
seems  t.oo  pessimistic  •.  On  the  other  hond,  thf-!  fclct  thut 
G.B.  wi  II~ continue  to  irnpoPt  n  ~weat  deal  of  food  and 
industrial  prod~1ci.:s  from  outside  the  Comrnunity  thr-~ugh 
the  own  rcsou rccs  me chan i srn  cou I d. i ncrca  s e  its  sh nr•e  of  tho 
Com m  u n i t y  b u d g c t  o v e r  the  1 9  ~~  key  men t  i o ned  i n  the 
Accession  TreAty  (British  estirn~tes  gave  figures  up  to 
2 4  ~~ l •  A  n y w  a y ,  i t  i s  I i k c I y  t hat  t h c  ,~ c  "' i I I  be  a  s e r  i o u s 
flap  between  the  British  budaet  share  and  its  shar~e  of the 
Community's  G.N~P. 
Thouuh  the  fifJUr'cs  !;JIVen  by  MP.  CALLAGHAN  cnn  be 
contest  eel,  it  is  obvious  that  thet~c  is  a  ren I  buduc t  . 
pro  b I c m  f o r  '" h i c h  \v e  h a v e  to  f i n d  e qu i t a b I c  so I u t  i on s • 
And  I  arn  convinced  that  it  wi  I I  be  possible to 
find  ways  and  rncans  to  I ightcn  the  eventual  undue  load 
of the  EEC  budget  on  the  Br-itish  economy. 14
Now l  cornc to my second quetltion  is thc1·c an.y f.uturc  for 
tho Eurc1pcnn: Connnunity.  'l'hc i:UJ.swor  to that ltas to dt';.!al  with two difforN.t 
though closely intcrrcla ted topics : 
- is tho econon1ic and n\oncla;ry union still credible ? 
has a  "political" Europe any  ~cnsc ? 
The link between these two topics  dcdv<;~s from the fact that 
.  . 
the E. M. U.  is still considered to be the "blueprint" for the econon:lic 
foundations of our political union.  l<'or reasons of clarity
1  however, 
I  \Vill try to treat them separately. 
I 
The first outstanding fact to n10ntion is that several countries 
. 
have in turn left the Comrnunity1 s  "monetary snake" :  first,  th(}  United 
KingdOin  a!"!d  Ireland,  on 23 June 1972 ;  th<::n  Italy,  on 13  Fcb:r.ua:r:y 197 3 
and finally France,  011.  20 January 1974:..  However,  in the prelirninary 
outlines,  this "monetary snake'' was both an essential and syrnbolic ~spect 
of the gradual progress towards monetary union.  Its abandonrnent·hy 
France itself,  which had been one of its 1najor advocates
1  was generally 
considered as a  first dernonstration o£ the danger that Community soliclarit) 
was becoming diluted. 
/: 
So the tin1e has come·to scrutinize the motivation,  the woxking 
and finally the future of E. M. U. 
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cconoq'lic rcas<,)ll!l  to transform the Counnon lvL\rkct. .l.nl:o  a.u  E.lvt. U. 
•.elwy  all derive from tho preoccupation. anc,l  thcncccssitics inhe::.·cn~ )n 
the creation o£ au cffoctivc: and efficient economic u11ion,  1..a  out present: 
economic  t~ystenw, it is not sufficient to abolish a  few  ob~:>taclcs at 
irCJntlo1•s in .order to achicvG l}cnuinc fl·ee nwvcnncnt of pcrsonD,  goods 
und capi.tti.l with.i11  the Comnmn.i.ty·.  'l'hb requires an alnbitious protjrarn 
of.11caslJres  going  fpt'  beyond  tho  classic  pattcr•ns  of tariff 
I 
/  ch~1ngcs to  create  .;,  custorns  un ron. 
Moreover,  the vigorous growth of intra-Con1.munity tra.c.le abo 
increases the interdependence of the Member States.  No doubt thdr 
econornic development benefits from this.  but on the othe1· hand they aJ:e 
more sensitive to short-ternt economic fluctuations in the neighbouring 
countries,  both as regards the  tl~ythrn of their economic activity and thcd~· 
balance of payments cquilibritu11.  The difficulties inherent in this. situal.i(J;, 
cannot be resolved if the 1vfcn>ber States each continue to cal.·ry out  es;::·~n·· 
. tially independent policies. 
The recent Italian and Danish r.neasures have shown how fragi.l.8 
a  customs union can be in the absence of a  worlcable E. M. U. 
When we look back at the .Community's achicvcmcmt in the 
]}}ODCl2JY field,  three important events stand out : 
- A  hal:-success  or a  half-failure :  the Comrnunity exchange systcrn, 
>. 
more commonly referred to  a·~ the "EEC snake" (now reduced to a 
mini-snake of hard-currency cotmtrics) ; 
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- Au ubol.·tivc venture  lhc pooling of rcscrvm; li.nked to the provision (•f 
short~torrn rnonetary uupport. 
lt must be recognized that tho money rnuddlq in which we hav(; 
found O\.u:sclvcs for some tirne now is further cornplicated by the appen.ra.n 
of the phenomenon of the raphl increase in the cost of encr  gy and the 
:rise in the price of raw materials,which  confronts us  w~th thefd.J.owing 
problems : 
the accclcra  tion, of world inflation ; 
tho rapid accumulation of .extreme I y  vo I at i I e  o i ! -do I I ars  ; 
the imbalance which will arise between the economies of the consurrwx 
' 
count des  \vhich will have to foot the bill and whose payrncnts balances 
' 
will be affected·; n  d i ffct' i ng  pr>oport ions  qy  the  higher  pr  1 ce  uf 
oil  and  of  imported  raw  materials. 
Taken this situation into account,  I  do not believe that a  Europe·1n 
monetary area,  grouping together all the Cornrnu.nity currenCies,  can be· 
set up .again in the very short term.  J'rancc had indeed announced her 
intention to hecom.e part of the Comrnunity  "sn~1 ke" agai-n  before 
the  summer,  but 1 doubt whether the economic and political conditions 
will allow this. 
,_ 
It is still more difficult to sec the lir'a and the pound coming 
back into the European monetary fold in the near futuro. 
.  ./  .. 17 lttlWcVOJ:'1  inthe!t•tt£tl'llll,1 1  d() ltOl  Lldul",  lh<1t  \'IC  ;;hollld[;,iYe llJ• 
tho idea of the  &9.!:El:l!!~.!!l1T  ~H·-U:-.:.0 an  .-1.  point of rdt.n·cmcc.  lt is a  clear; 
precise objective which implies cftortr> in  ~wcldttg economic cohesio.n, 
an o~scntial !actor in bringing OUl.·  cconomie!i clon,ct• together. 
The enduring natm:e of the idea of monetary cohesion iG  at 
present to be -seen in the existence of a  vil:tual DM nwnetary a1:ea which1 
as the days pass,  and despite ups awl downs,  is a  zone of relative  stability,~.· 
It is certain thai: this "pole of stability" rnay weH attract other 
currencies.  even those of countries outside the Community.  Both the 
Community and international rclation:s in genc~al can benefit from the de~ 
velop1nent of such a  monetary area which directly follows what is consider  e.' · 
in economic theory as a  "regional approach"~  This is a  preliminary app  eo<1.: 
which must be kept in 1nincl. 
,. 
Face.d \vith the failure of pr·evious shemes,  so1ne quarters ha•,re 
proposed  - as a.  way out of the actual inertia - the immecl~ate crea.tion  ~f  .. 
a  com1non cu~rencx.. (the Europa).  This idea is perhaps not ~o he rejected 
as a  lever,  but I  should like to add that the conditions governing the final . 
success of such a  con1mon currency seem to me to be n1.uch the same as 
those determining the success of schemes which are at present in an imp3.SG( 
II 
II 
In other words,  the Europa is not an alternative if the political will is  lackin.~ 
/ 
I 
and when th:s will exists,  the previous schemes can be revitalized. 
_..\_.:lot:ler  line of approach,  essential m:· any new conception o£ tlw  . 
international r-:tonetary system,  is the more and more com1non acceptance 
of the "cont::-olle:d floating'' currency  r-~s~Ll..·  Enough experience has been 
gained in \r.:hat has been called 
1'this lack of a  system" to evaluate its rrtex·its 
and dangers. 
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Of.  cout•so,  ,'"\  l'<wl  Conrnunity  !.1MHlOf;  be  bui II;  011  such 
u  s >' s t n Ill  f o I''  i t s  i n b.H'  n  .:1 I  r· c I <d; i o rH; •  N  n v c r·• t h  c  It~ s s ,  i t s 
accept.;"lnce,  in  eli  PFicul t  circur!l!;·d;nncen,  en.ablen  a  IiI it to 
be  put  on  intervention  mo<1sirl"es  np  competitive  pol icics 
w  h i c h  i t' r e v o c <''l h I y  d i s t: o P t  .  our•  econom 1 e~• •  1\ t  this  levc I ,  . 
bel ievt.'!  th<-·d~  the  Floot:in~J  of  ceri:uin  c:ur•r•nncies· rs  at  present: 
tl  lc:nlscr  evi 1. 
And  \Ve  shou I d  i ndced  not  fot'9et  that  the  mini -sn0kc, 
which  wo  bi'lve  m<JnnsJed  to keep,  is  not:h i ng  e I se  but  a  control I  ~~d 
j o i n t  - f I out:  of  t h  c  p a I'  t  i c i p r?l t  i n g  c tH' I' en  c i c s  r n  r c I a t i on  to  the 
dolle~r,  New  mechanisms  could  pel'haps  be  deviced  for  a  grfidu<ltPcl 
move  to1·wrds  an  "all-Community  joi.nt-float"  ? 
The  need  for 
a  techn i cui  reve~l u<d; ion  sterns  from  the  fHct  that,  under  the 
ex i s t  i n 9  con  d i t  i on s ,  t  h c  off  i c i a I  ~J u  i d  r· o s e r v e s  <:1 r e  p r act i c<J I I y 
useless  :  to  meet  a  bAlance  of  pAyments  deficit,  the.gold 
reserves  cou I d  only  be  us\!~l  under  the  rid  i cuI ous  i'lssumpt ion 
t h  fl t  o u ,.,  Cent  r o I  B  i1 n k s  \" o u I cl  be  rea  d y  t o  s e  I I  i t  fl t  the 
officiul  pt'lce,  I.e.  four•  times  less  thiln  the  nwr·ket  pr1ce. 
As  for  the  I.M.F.  :  at  the  offici ell  pr~icc, ·.its hoard  Is 
Horth  about  ~  6. 5  bi I I ion  ;  ot  market  pr~r ccs,  i (:  wou I d  be 
wot'th  in  excess  of S  25  bi I I ion.  The  ppofit  could  be  used 
to  help  the  less  developed  countries. 
The  Com•nunity  ~linister•s  of  Finnnce  reuchcd  nn  aflreerncnl: 
on  this mutter  in  Zcist;  they  arranued  some  consultations  witl 
t he  lJ n i t  e d  C:. t  i'l ·tc: s ,  u n d  I a t e t•  i n  t h c  "G r o u p  of  Ten " •  c:.·  ,  1 nee 
the  recent 
\•i  e~ s h i n  ~J t o n 
mc-:-'!tin9  of  the  1 • .\!.F. 's  Cor:1mittec  of  TwC!nty  in 
(11-12  June'  we  know  that  in  the  foreseeable  . 
future  the  new  "mechan i srn"  \·1 i I I  be  approved  and  put  to  \"ork. 
I 
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~  ~  ... ~ ..  •  ~  •  f  "  .-,  ..  .  .  .  -....  ·~- :  '  . 
. "fhere  is  no  point  i.n  dony i no  i;hot  .th~  Gommut~  H;y  r  :J  COt'ne  I' r.H 
on  ol'l  sldc:s  in  its  pL~1ns fop  monebat"y  in·tcgration:  seve"~r·.:d  fHII~l:· 
-·  ~.._.·kers' Have  t c·F·t  the  tmake6  the  poor ins  o·f  r.c:;HH'VCH)  has. be(H\  pul:.  o! 
·  ~i r\definite  I y ... •  .'  There  1  s  even  o  tcnd<:n(;y  to\o~ards' 'l  t"esurg~nce 
proct.:ices., 
. . 
.. .  .  ~.  .  ·.  . .. 
.  .  ·:.  ;.·  . 
"  ..  " ...  . .  .  ...  ; •  ..  •, . 
. . .  ·  ...  ~  ';,  . 
In  fr.ontof ol l  these foi lure:!.:;  anti  pr•oble.ms,  ,..,lurb  He  ne0c.L·'' 
- . 
mos~:  is a  new  po J i :!:ls:!JJ  .;Lr:l ve.  O!:J3 ins  t  the  rna ny  cha l len  9cs  J-nc i n  £i 
us at fo.reig.n  arid  cloirH!S'i:ic  lc!Yci..  V/hat  Eut~ope  racks  mo~)c  h.>  ·h·u~2 
leadcr"ship  ....  Unless  it is hoped that  sai~.~·l:ior1  wi 11  come·from 
some  outside force!  . .... . .  ·  ;  ·  ... 
.  ,. 
•  ...  •  •  •  •  ... :  f  ~  ••• 
At  the rnore  concrete·  level  of  ~MU,  one  of.the main tasks 
is to ensure thut -there  is effr.!ct: i ve  conve1"9cnce  .o.P.  econorn i c _ 
.  ·  .  . ...  ~. :  ..  :~..  .. ·..  .  .... ·  .. 
policies.: 
-- .  .- . 
The  so; uti on  ·co  ·ch i_'s  Pi"ob I ern  requ lpes  tho·t.  -'cr"cncl~  · ·- . 
in  cartain national  economic  6ggrcgatcs,  especially prices·-
and the balance of payments,  be  sufficiently parallel. in the 
various  P.lembcr  State::;  .:;co  l i mit the frequency  and  c.x1:cnt, of pari  ·f:y 
modifi·cations1  without  ::wc1  .. ificing the  l.eveJ  of  employman·t:  or. 
c-conon1ic  growth..  ::·  ·  · ..  _ :·  .. ·.  ·: ..  :.' .. 
. . ..  ·.  -...  -.  ·; 
-~  ......  r  ..  .  .  ..  .  .  .  •.  .  . . :  ..... :  .  ~ 
This  1n  one  rather  Jong  sentence  - is the .. 'r.'hoie  f.>r"oblern  .  . 
of the trade-off between  i nf  I at  ion  and  emp i oyment,: -that of the 
different priorities,  of solidarity between  Member  States and of 
the  decision-making  c~ntre.  A  few  words  on  these  ltist two 
Qu~stions: 
The  pursuit  of  ~ntcgratia~ requsres  ~ember States to accept, 
as the  nor~al  rule,  the transfer of  incomes  and  Prosperity from 
the  rnost  deve I oped  regions  to\wrds the  I e.:1sf:  clevc 1 oped  regions 
of the  Community.  Without  this,  the  v~ry fact·of  intesration 
..,/ ..  '  ....  -20
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-. 
t:he  !)up  bt~~t\v<.'.lCtl  P j ch  and  poor  t'G[J f OTl;:  Of '·cho'. 
Communi-ty,.  pt\Q.vo~ed by the fl i old:  oP  the  fttd:;ol--n  of  Pl"Od;.!c:td Oti 
-·  - .  * 
fr"orn  r'c.glons  o·F  si ow. bl"'  ::cro  swo\Jtn  to\-.wr-,.b  ·l;hc  ITior·c  dynt;m i c. 
ones.  A  prdncir-?l~ t?f  sol idrwH.:y, · td t'Li·H.iy  occ:opt;ecl  -for- some· 
t.imt:!t  tlO\~  et  pta•el~l  nation.;d  lev(;;!#  mus·l:  tilct·efol  .... et.be  act.:nptc.?d. 
~  .. .  ..  ~·rt  ~ommunity level ..  ··  ft  is t·his  that  1s  the  true  and  continuin~.J 
Justification of  a  Cornrnunity.·regioncd  pol icy  ~11id  not,.' as  i~  ll<'"IS 
6ft~n  b~en presented  in  Britain,  as  n  simple  device  for  octtino 
morE\  money  bac!<.  out  of the  Community  kitty than  you  put  tn • 
.  The  solution to this pr·oblem also cal f.s  for- ~csponsibi  l i·::ir:: 
to be  transferred to the  Community  outho~ities~  A harmonized  .. 
economic  pol icy  is not  conc.::ivabrc  in  a  context  rn  \.Jhich  C!ach 
f,lernbcr•  State cou l cl  choose  ~"~a  I a  CcH•ten .bcbJecn  Comrnun i·ty  objcc.:{:  ....  :· 
i vcs and their means  of  imp l emeritat i Cln.,  This  is the  pr·obJ;;rn 
of supranationality,  which, 
structure of future  Europe. 
.  . 
irl  ·turn,  raises ·th,:d;  o·P  the politic'-d' 
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2 •  0 o e ~  c.1 
11 p o I i U  co I "  £  ri r• ope  I  w vc  n n y  s c n s c  . ?  __ .,....,._ ..  __ ----~-------- ... ---·---·-t  ..... _  _..., ______  _ 
first:,  it 'should  bt,  rem{~mbured tHnt  all  the  i.nitiativcs 
"taken  aft~~·tho second  World  War  in  the  field  of Western 
EuPope 'B  co  ope rn t ion  and .integration  had  p r i rna I' i I y  oub.;pokc~n 
p6fitical  objectiv~s~ 
• . !  .  \. 
Even  the  EEC  and  Eur~tom,  though  pursuing  as  such  economic  goals,  wars 
explicitly rne=nt  t:~s  intermediate stations on  thG  road  to  a  rnore  'general 
and  thus  "political"  europei'ln  ini:CQI"iltion.  And  ther'e  is  no 
. -.-. ..  ·.: 
doubt  at  all  that  t_hc  american  suppoPt· for  European  integr•ation 
was  mainly  inspired  by  pol !tical  considerations.  In  his 
.- '  .  .  . .  .  ,  .·  .  --
famous  book  "The  Troubled  Partnership",  Henry  KISSINGER  states: 
"11./e  S2lH  Eut'ope  ns  u  potonticd  pnd:neP  eventually sharing Hith 
u s  b u r· den s  a n d  ,~ c s p on s i b i  I i t  i c s  of  H o 1' I d  I co  cl e r s h i ·p  ·~  Nos  t  . 
pronouncernents  of  1\mericnn  pur•poses  reflected  our  expectation 
that  a ftcr  its  recovery,  EuPopc  Hou I d  no  !.'onsJcr' 
rcauire  Arner·ican  economic  assistnnce  but  Houfd  continue to 
pursue  parallel  if  not  idcnticol  policies".  (p.7L 
-And,  am  I  wrong  in saying that,  Hhatevar good  economic  and  co~narcia1 
reasons  the  io~~ar Government  may  have  had  for joining the Six,  the decision 
to do  so.  like :he decision of  the Wilson  Goverffinent  in  19G7  to apply  for 
~lornbership,  \'/::!3  :oainly  based  on  polHical  cons:i.clerations  ? 
In  my  rn i nrl,  there  is  no  doubt  at  il I I  th ut  the  under! yi nf.) 
no I i t i c iJ  I  ::-> h i I o so  ~  h y ,  1 • e .  t  r~ Y i n SJ  ·to  a c q u i  r~ e  n e \v  s t r'  c n 9 t h 
and  \ve<11 th  in  putt: i n<J  certu i 0  •ncans  and  cif fot·ts  together 
in  the  fra"'1Ch<>r
1 <  of  em  effective  Com111unity,  t~crnair.s  entirely 
vnl id •  ..\nd  so  is  even  more  the  pol iticill  final H.:y  of  the 
[upopcan  Co~munity. 
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is  indeed  ho  ilterh~tivc  ih trying to  giv~ 
'now.·pol)tic-al  dimension  Hhieh _would l.i{lo\ot··thc  big  cou,nl:rie.s 
;:.  ~  =  - -:::  -:- - - _; 
to pin>'  a  .r~l~;  in  \1orld  i;lfPnirs  ~.,rhich  thc!y  could  not  hope 
to fu If  i) I  if.  tfvJy  kept  l""~e r y ing  on  {~hei I'  i ndi vi dun r  stt~cneth 
and  i nfl  uen~e,  to  enab I e  the  sm.:d  I cr  c~u,nt  r· ics  t'o shar~ :in. 
that  increaseJ  influence  thtinks to the  Community  d~c~~ion~ 
··::making.·.  ·.Onf~  ()'pot itical  E\.tr·opo  can  gtwrimte0  tha·t: ou1  ..  ·at•<.:H.l 
•  _  i  •  - I  •  •  _-
dou i d  perfo.--,  i t:s  nws t  i nd i spens<Jb i e  mission b)  tl~e  \•/or I d 
to  remain,· desoite all the.  shos"tcornings,  the  har-dship  ntid  c~ven 
the cruelties 'Nhich  paved  itn history/  a  model  of  civi li:z:utioil 
in  which  men's  individual  ospirations to  progress  and  freedom  .  . 
arc  kept  in  balance with  the. dt~mands of the  society.  :· 
Now  thi~ is  cle~rl~ i~  J•  a. ·0;"' ~' r• c'"- "-•  ....  ~ .. ,.  ') .. 
.  .  .  .  ...  .  ....  t  ;, .::: .·  .  . 
'And the  paradox  is that 
what  the  Bri~ish  Governme~t  is aiming at- at  least  officially-· 
oncl  \-thot. CO'clid  "'lake  the  Comtnlmity  accept:oble  i:o  i-t,  is precisely' 
a  state of  ::~fa i l"s  Hh i ch  '"o4I d  doom  this  gt'c:at  European  des i £)!'1,  .  .  . 
And  if the  oo I it  i ca I  f ina I i ty  ft->des  B\'lcly,.  then  t!H~  danger• 
wr!J  turn  u::- ;:hat  the  Cc·mmunity  Hi  II  be  nd:',,r.lO~e  than  a  "Mo>;i-. 
Ben0lux"- w~ich  is  not to neglect;  but  which  economic  and 
political  i-...-::>:~tancc  and  attractiveness  {~o  the  membcr·$tC~tcs 
and  to  the  o~tside world  as  well  wbuld  be  very  I imitcd.· 
I  f  II  '  d  "'  't II  · rnuc 1  o· ·  a  c  -::>se  vom:nun 1 ·y  • 
'  The  fear  ~as  been  ~xprcssccl many  ti~es that  Europe  was  too 
to this  "in~er.:.l-looking" attitude  \.;hose  featui'cs. unci  doings_ 
h a v e  c x c e I l c :::: e I v  beer)  des  c r i be  d  .  b v  And r c H  S H  0 N  F I E L  0 •  8 u t  .  - ,  . 
Britain  was  expected to  remedy· 
there  is  on~  ~Jint  thot  has  to  h8  str~isthnncd out  :  there  rs 
no  Europe, 
i.d~!rd: i ty". 
"·  •  wi  II  not  be  s  :.:;ropean  identity,  if to  some  ex-tent  there  ar·e 
no  I imits  t::  ::-1e  frcedcm  of  tlie  rnernber_  States to  do  Hhat  t;.hcy 
.... 23
tn  thcil"  OI.Jn  interest.  And  t;hi~  iry1J.'Iic:1  n 
(  or•  t t'MHd~<~P  \  of  sovo POi on t: y •  And  I  \¥0~1 I d 
t i ko  to. f!dd  thn  t ·this "rcri I locot ion"  means  vc  ~'Y  o ftcn  the~  - - -- -
.J:£.hl~or~;,f.:i6n  .:at  .:1  COmmunity  level  of  po1o~cP~  l·thich·  OlH' 
· nflt i orial  ·stnfcs  have  in fact  I os  t:  a I to~1e  t h c r~  1 
-:. ;  1  •  ·- ~  ~_:,-·  •  ~. 
~  .....  , . :  ,;Ther\~  is olso'nd  EtJt'.of)G  iF  therc.ure.._no  re:atures 
\vhich  distinDuish  us  from  the .other·  Powers.  This  does 
not  m  c <1 n ,  of  co  u r~ s e 1  t h o t  to  be  u  good  E  u I'  o p e n n  i m  p I i e s 
a  chr~onic hosti I i·ty  tov,.(1Pds  the  US:\.  On  the  contrar:-y. 
Of  C:<?Ur.'~t!!r  it,is qlsQ  no.rmul  th<'lt  1n  BPitain  many  d~ubts 
subsis·t  about  the  political  finality  of  Eur'opc.  It  ts  no 
easy  task  to  dcpoPt  frorn  hundr·cd  years  of  hi s·tory.  It  seems 
to  me  that  BPitain  is  nmv  undcr9oinD  the  crisis of  national 
conscience  which  the  Get•mans'  (lvith  the  shock  therapy  of 
total  defeat)  and  the  French  (with  dc;conol izution  and  the 
collapse  of  the  4th  Republic)  have  knovm  before. 
And  then,  there  is  the  fundaincnta I  question  :  does  Great-
Britain  have  a  real  and  va I i cl  c1  I tet'na  t  i ve  to  an  effective 
European  Cornrnun i ty  7  So•nc  peop I e  th j nk  it  has  :  c i thcr  by 
turning  definitely to  the  USA,  or  just bt  continuing  sttting 
on  the  fence. 
. .  ~- ~  ' . 
I  wonder  if this approach  is  not  an  iII usi on.· 
For  instonce,  I  con  hardly· see  the  intcr'est  of  Gr"'eat  Brituin 
i n  a  s h at  t ere  d  E  u ron  e ,  b t' i n  ~  i n 9  \.J i t h  i t  a  rev  i v a I  o F  b i I Ht ePa I 
re_lations 1  esoecinJ ly  \>Jith  _the  U~.A!'  I  can  irnuginc  th~·C,.  in 
this context,  the ·latter will  rely more. on  Gcr!liCiny  than  on 
Great  Br-itain. 24
r1o  t'~nn.I,C<::c)  e i t:IH;r·.  I t  i l'!> 
fund<'l'lln,,t~r· i•'l•oor•fiHlcc  for"  the  cc,>nt>rlri e  futur•e 
T~rJt.ol.n, .b\Jt.  ih  \vil.l:  'ccl'tninl.y  not  lwin'n  !:.olutions ftwfl,c  •. 
. d:cotllVnic.rurd  socic.•l  pr·obi<~'IH). ·  ,\nd  it is  not  g~illfi  t() c!HltHJh 
~ub~lf;(lnticilly  .. thc Br•itish  ponition  in  \..-ot•.ld  nfff.;,ir-n •.  Whc:flYTt 
Hilldo is. to  HIve your  COlllltr-y 'o  .I.H:Iv 'an..:l  Prom j r.d  n<:1  ohnne•'l 
. . 
- .  ~  '  .  ~ i:  ' -.  ~  ...  ·~ 
Fi n.::,,··conc I us ion 
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chc:n•isrnatic  th.:ln  ·j n  the  I ust  te11  )'cars,  bul:  mor•e  opt,  moybl."t, 
to seize <:the  oppoi  ... ~un'i ties thnt  at;c  offer•cd  to  them  to  I cov0 
their mar_k;·on  hist~~y.  I ·am  r~efer·r~ing to  the  fildf that 
H.  SCI-1/i}IDT·and  V.  GISCHAD  d'ESIAING ·have  recently  boen  Ci'illt:·Hl 
to·:i;:~ke:-:~m.n)e  :h.id_h_~s·t-~·~,y~l  i~t:_.ip.JI  ..  re.spo,nsj_bi l)tics<)n  ;t;lw_i_~~. 
countries.  They  fwvc  several  things  in  cornmon,  us  for•mnt"' 
,\linisters  of  Firwncc 1  and  to.  a  cer•tain  degree  -thou(.JI~  cornillf.J 
fr•om  different political  hor~izons -·as  fr·icnds.  It seems 
significant thut  the  first visit of  GISCM\D  as  n  Pt•csidont 
wi I I  be to  Bonn. 
·There  is  no  doubt  that  i:he  nch'  poI it  i ca I  I cadcrs  of  Eur-ope 
,.,; II  leave  a  strong  murk  on  history.  If  they  succeed  in 
rcscu i ng  Europ(O'  of  one  of  th'ose  crisis  \vh i ch  are too  deep I y 
i ntcrwovcn  with  the  Cornmun i ty 
1 s  hi story.  lt:  \vOU 1  c1  be.  sad 
indeed  if there  \-.'er~e  no  Br~itish  PPime  ~linistcr adding  his 
weight  constructively to this  new  phase  ir1  the  Community's 
· dove I opnent. 
.  ~  .. , .  .  .  .  ...  ..  .  .  r-:-. 
There  ts  a  broc'ld  scope  of  discussion,  .. rnutuul  UIH.Ier"sf::i:lndilltl 
and  even  goodHi II,  but  there  is  u  tremendous  lnck  oF  irnaninntio11. 
an d  po I i t  i c a I  \·l i I I •  h ope  I  rna de  c I ear~  t hat  on  many  '.) o i n  i; 0 
t  h e t" e  i s  a  o o s s i b i I i t  v  of  an  r:1 9 r· e c rn en  t  . 
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